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OF THIRD-PARTY BATHWATER: HOW TO
THROW OUT THE THIRD-PARTY
DOCTRINE WHILE PRESERVING
GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO USE SECRET
AGENTS
AMY L. PEIKOFFt
INTRODUCTION

Whether you refer to Edward Snowden-the former
employee of a National Security Agency ("NSA") contractor who
2
has been charged with espionage'-as a hero or as a traitor
likely depends on your opinion of the programs he has admitted
to publicizing' via his leaking of highly classified documents. In
t Visiting Associate Professor of Law and Research Fellow, Southwestern Law
School; University of Southern California (Ph.D., 2003); University of California, Los
Angeles (J.D., 1998). I am grateful to the Anthem Foundation for Objectivist
Scholarship for its support of my research and to APEE for the opportunity to
present this Article as a work in progress. I would also like to thank the editorial
board and members of St. John's Law Review for their assistance in preparing this
Article for publication. I dedicate this Article to Edward Snowden, who, as of the
time this Article is going to press, is still stuck in Russia.
1 U.S. Requests Snowden's Extradition, WALL ST. J. (June 22, 2013, 4:51 PM),
https://web.archive.orgweb/2013090 1080345/http://online.wsj .comlarticle/SB100014
24127887324577904578561731593350320.html.
2 Andrew Aylward, Poll: Most See Snowden as Whistleblower Not Traitor,WALL
ST. J. BLOG (July 10, 2013, 12:51 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/
07/10/poll-most-see-snowden-as-whistleblower-not-traitor/?mod=wsj-streaming-thesurveillance-programs. Among the most vocal of Snowden's critics are former U.N.
Ambassador John Bolton, who has repeatedly asked about Snowden, "[Who died
and made him king?" and the host of Fox News's Red Eye and co-host of The Five,
Greg Gutfeld, who has repeatedly referred to Snowden as a traitor and hypocrite.
See Melanie Batley & John Bachman, John Bolton: Snowden 'Committed Act of War
Against United States,' NEWSMAX (June 11, 2013, 2:26 PM), http://www.news
max.com/Newsfront/bolton-snowden-nsa-leaks/2013/06/1 1/id509318/.
3 Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon
Customers Daily, THE GUARDIAN (June 5, 2013), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/
2013/junI06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order;
Glenn Greenwald & Ewen
MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps in to User Data of Apple, Google and Others,
THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/ustech-giants-nsa-data. It is not clear whether documents revealing the existence of a
third program, a program involving the collection of U.S. email records in bulk, were
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one program, Snowden revealed that the NSA has been
continuously collecting phone record "metadata" of all Verizon
customers for the last seven years.4 In another, we have learned
that the NSA has gained access to e-mail and other forms of
Internet communication-including Skype voice and video
communications-via a secret program called Prism.5 The latter
has been portrayed by the director of national intelligence, James
Clapper, and others as "acquiring" information only about
However, Clapper's use of the word "acquire"
foreigners.
apparently has a tortured meaning, such that "49-plus percent of
the communications [intercepted and stored under the Prism
program] might be purely among Americans."6
Even before Snowden came forward with evidence of these
programs, one could regularly read stories about vast
government databases-some that already exist, some that are
works in progress,' some threatened as part of pending
leaked by Snowden. See Glenn Greenwald & Spencer Ackerman, NSA Collected US
Email Records in Bulk for More than Two Years Under Obama, THE GUARDIAN
(June 27, 2013), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/27/nsa-data-miningauthorised-obama/.
4 Greenwald, supra note 3. An amendment that would have stopped the NSA
from continuing its bulk collection of telephone metadata was voted down last year
by a narrow margin in the House. Siobhan Hughes & Siobhan Gorman, Move to
Curb NSA Surveillance ProgramDefeated in House, WALL ST. J. (July 24, 2013, 8:25
PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873245647045786264108460981
92.html. This past spring, headlines announced the end of the bulk metadata
collection program, when in fact Obama is asking to continue the program, as is, for
at least another three months. After three months, we are told, he may request that
Congress pass a law requiring the phone companies to retain the metadata. The only
significant change would be the length of time the data would be retained: eighteen
months instead of five years. Charlie Savage, Obama To Call for End to N.S.A.'s
Bulk Data Collection, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/
25/us/obama-to-seek-nsa-curb-on-call-data.html?_r=0.
5 Greenwald & MacAskill, supra note 3; see also Kari Rea, Glenn Greenwald:
Low-Level NSA Analysts Have 'Powerful and Invasive' Search Tool, ABC NEWS (July
28, 2013, 10:17 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/07/glenn-greenwaldlow-level-nsa-analysts-have-powerful-and-invasive-search-tool/ (describing a search
tool, accessible to low-level NSA analysts, that would allow the analyst to "listen to
the calls or read the emails of everything that the NSA has stored, or look at the
browsing histories or Google search terms that you've entered" based on an email
address or an IP address).
6 Jennifer Stisa Granick & Christopher Jon Sprigman, Op-Ed., The Criminal
N.S.A., N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/28/opinion/thecriminal-nsa.html?pagewanted=all.
7 E.g., James Bamford, The NSA Is Building the Country's Biggest Spy Center
(Watch What You Say), WIRED (Mar. 15, 2012, 7:24 PM), http://www.wired.com/
threatlevel/2012/03/ff_nsadatacenter/; see also Kashmir Hill, Surprise Visitors Are
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legislation'-containing various types of personal information
about Americans.
Snowden, then, in coming forward with
documentary evidence of such programs, has succeeded in
attracting more attention to them. Now the question is: Will
anything be done about them?
Proponents of the programs at issue have argued that,
assuming they: (1) collect, in the absence of probable cause and
particularized suspicion, nothing more than metadata; and
(2) make it easier for the government to identify and track
suspected terrorists, they strike the right "balance" between
privacy and security. Some have argued, in addition, that the
programs are perfectly legal. According to the "third-party
doctrine," there is no "reasonable expectation of privacy" in
metadata we share with our phone companies, Internet Service
Providers ("ISPs"), and so forth. Additionally, the collection of
this metadata is authorized by the Patriot Act 9 or the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Amendments Act ("FISA Amendments
Act").10
Others disagree with the above normative and legal
conclusions; they argue that metadata is more important than
most people realize" and, moreover, that the arguments for the
programs' legality are flawed. 12 With respect to the latter, one
can make a few distinct arguments: First, one can argue that the
applicable statutes do not authorize these NSA programs-that
is, that these programs go too far. 13 Second, one can argue that
the relevant statutes are properly applied, but are themselves
illegal-actually, unconstitutional-because they do not come
Unwelcome at the NSA's Unfinished Utah Spy Center (Especially When They Take
Photos), FORBES (Mar. 4, 2013, 12:21 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/
2013/03/04/nsa-utah-data-center-visit.
8 E.g., David Kravets, Biometric Database of All Adult Americans Hidden in
ImmigrationReform, WIRED (May, 10, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/threat
level/2013/05/immigration-reform-dossiers/.
I The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 ("USA PATRIOT ACT"),
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2012)).
10 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub.
L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1881c (Supp. II
2008)).
11 Daniel J. Solove, 5 Myths About Privacy, WASH. POST, June 16, 2013, at B03.
12 See Granick & Sprigman, supra note 6.
13 Id. (arguing that the Patriot Act and the FISA Amendments Act do not
authorize the bulk collection of Verizon customers' metadata and PRISM,
respectively).
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under the third-party doctrine. Third, one can argue that what
one believes regarding the relevant statutes' applicability or
purported constitutionality is beside the point-the third-party
doctrine itself is flawed and should be eliminated.14 It is this last
position that I wish to support in this Article.
In Part I of this Article, I discuss the third-party doctrine,
including its history, the types of cases to which it has been
applied, and arguments in favor of and against it, with particular
focus on Orin Kerr's defense15 of the doctrine. In Part II, I
propose an alternative-and, I think, better-way of dealing with
cases typically thought to fall under this doctrine. My proposal,
as we will see, rests upon the model for the legal protection of
privacy that I have elucidated and defended in prior articles: a
model based on our rights to property and contract. 6 Finally, in
Part III, I enlist the help of the common law of contract to
address an objection to my proposal, in hopes of improving its
appeal to the reader.
I.

THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE

The third-party doctrine says that the Fourth Amendment 7
is not implicated when (1) you share information with a third
party-for example, your bank, your phone company, your ISP,
Skype, or Facebook-even for a delimited purpose; and (2) the
third party turns around and shares the information with the
government.18 Most believe this is the case because, per the

14 While not explicitly mentioning the third-party doctrine, Professor Randy
Barnett seems to be making either the second or third argument in a recent op-ed
piece. Randy E. Barnett, Op-Ed., The NSA's Surveillance Is Unconstitutional,WALL

ST. J., July 12, 2013, at A13.
15 Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MIcH. L. REV. 561,

562 (2009).
16 See, e.g., Amy L. Peikoff, Beyond Reductionism: Reconsidering the Right to
Privacy, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1, 5 (2008).
17 The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and

effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
18 Kerr, supra note

15, at 563. "The 'third-party doctrine' is the Fourth
Amendment rule that governs collection of evidence from third parties in criminal
investigations. The rule is simple: By disclosing to a third party, the subject gives
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usual understanding of the doctrine, you no longer have a
"reasonable expectation of privacy" in the information you share
with a third party. And since "reasonable expectation of privacy"
is, with some exceptions, the current legal test for whether
government activity amounts to a search under the Fourth
Amendment,19 this means that the government's obtaining
information from third parties, and then of aggregating that
information in databases upon which it performs inquiries of
various kinds, is not a search. Orin Kerr disagrees with this
formulation of the doctrine, saying, "[TIhe third-party doctrine is
better understood as a form of consent rather than as an
application of Katz."2 ° On either understanding of the rationale
for the doctrine, statutes such as the Patriot Act 21 or the FISA
Amendments Act 22 may authorize the government's broad
information gathering and aggregating activities without the
requirement of a warrant based on probable cause and
particularized suspicion.
How did we get here? The doctrine first arose and was
developed in a series of cases called the "secret agent" cases.23
Think of Tony Soprano divulging information about the operation
of his illegal businesses to a government informant, and the
informant later turning that information over to the government
prosecutor, who uses it to indict and prosecute Soprano. The fact
that the Fourth Amendment does not protect the Tony Sopranos
of the world in situations like this probably does not bother us.
But then the doctrine was extended, starting in the early 1970s,
to apply not only to the Tony Sopranos of the world, but also to

up all of his Fourth Amendment rights in the information revealed." Id. (footnote
omitted).
19 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
20 Kerr, supra note 15, at 588.
21 The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 ("USA PATRIOT ACT"),
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2012)).
22 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub.
L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1881c (Supp. II
2008)).
23 Kerr, supra note 15, at 567-68 (discussing the "secret agent" cases that came
before the Supreme Court between the years 1952 and 1971).
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you and me (I am assuming that none of us is in the mafia) when
we share information with third parties in the ordinary course of
doing business and living our lives.2 4
Considering
the
third-party
doctrine's
disturbing
implications, one would think that, by now, it would have been
overturned or its application severely limited. While it might
take the revelations of a former employee of an NSA contractor to
get the general public interested in this issue, that should not be
true of those in the legal profession. For his part, Stephen
Henderson argues 25 that the Supreme Court has long refused to
apply the third-party doctrine "in a strong form"-that is, as a
categorical rule like that described at the beginning of this Part,
as well as in United States v. Miller26:
[Tihe Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of
information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to
Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on
the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose
and the confidence placed in the third party will not be
betrayed.27
Henderson describes the 2012 case, United States v. Jones,28
as the most recent in a series of "encouraging" cases, cases in
which Supreme Court Justices have shown their willingness to
reject the "strong", categorical form of the third-party doctrine in
favor of "a case-by-case" approach.29
In Jones, the Court
unanimously held that attaching a GPS tracking device to a
vehicle, and then using the device to track the vehicle's location,
is a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment."
In her
concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor calls for the third-party
doctrine to be reexamined:

24 See id. at 569-70 (discussing "business records" cases heard by the Supreme
Court between the years 1973 and 1980).
25 Stephen E. Henderson, After United States v. Jones, After the Fourth
Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 431, 432, 436-42 (2013).
"[I]n at least five decisions the Supreme Court has shied away from applying a
strong third party doctrine." Id. at 442; see also Stephen E. Henderson, The Timely
Demise of the Fourth Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 39,
42-43 (2011).
26 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
27 Id. at 443.
28

29

132 S.Ct. 945 (2012).
Henderson, supra note 25, at 432, 458.

30 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
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[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.
This
approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a
great deal of information about themselves to third parties in
the course of carrying out mundane tasks. People disclose the
phone numbers that they dial or text to their cellular providers;
the URLs that they visit and the e-mail addresses with which
they correspond to their Internet service providers; and the
books, groceries, and medications they purchase to online
31
retailers.
Given Sotomayor's concerns about telephone and Internet
metadata that she expresses in this passage, it seems that she
might be ready to overturn the third-party doctrine in an
appropriate case challenging the invasive NSA programs
discussed earlier in this Article. 2
But note that Sotomayor
interprets the doctrine as an application of the Katz "reasonableexpectation[s]" test.33 It is therefore likely that Kerr, and those
who agree with his consent-based understanding of the doctrine,
would be undeterred by Sotomayor's call to reconsider it, and
would continue to defend it.
A.

Defending the Doctrine: Orin Kerr

Kerr defends the third-party doctrine on two grounds. First,
he says:
Without the doctrine, criminals could use third-party agents to
fully enshroud their criminal enterprises in Fourth Amendment
protection. A criminal could plot and execute his entire crime
from home knowing that the police could not send in undercover
agents, record the fact of his phone calls, or watch any aspect of
his Internet usage without first obtaining a warrant. He could
use third parties to create a bubble of Fourth Amendment
protection around the entirety of his criminal activity.34

31
32

33
3'

Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954-55.
Kerr, supra note 15, at 576.
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With no third-party doctrine, Kerr argues, it would be nearly
impossible for the police to gain enough evidence to support a
search warrant, particularly when a criminal is clever at
substituting
private,
third-party-assisted
actions
and
transactions for those that were once, of necessity, amenable to
public viewing.35 The doctrine, therefore, in Kerr's terms, avoids
the "substitution effect" and thereby preserves the "technological
neutrality" intended by the Court in Katz. 36 "Just as the new
technologies can bring 'intimate occurrences of the home' out in
the open, so can technological change and the use of third parties
take transactions that were out in the open and bring them
inside."3 7
If it is right to understand the Fourth Amendment from this
perspective of technological neutrality, Kerr argues, then "it
must be a two-way street.""
So, just as the "reasonable
expectation of privacy" test of Katz addresses the problem of
technology exposing intimate details of one's life, the third-party
doctrine addresses the problem of criminals substituting private,
third-party transactions for actions conducted out in the open.
Kerr notes that the doctrine thus provides another type of
neutrality, in that a criminal enjoys "roughly the same degree of
privacy protection regardless of whether [the] criminal commits
crimes on his own or uses third parties."3 9
Kerr's second argument in defense of the third-party
doctrine is that it helps to ensure the clarity of Fourth
Amendment rules.4 ° The need for clarity, says Kerr, comes from
the exclusionary rule's evidence-suppression remedy:
The severe costs of the exclusionary rule require ex ante clarity
in the rules for when a reasonable expectation of privacy exists.
The police need to know when their conduct triggers Fourth
Amendment protection. Uncertainty can both overdeter police
from acting when no protection exists and can lead
them to
41
inadvertently trample on Fourth Amendment rights.

See id. at 575-76.
Id. at 580-81.
" Id. at 580.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 577.
40 Id. at 581.
41 Id. at 582.
11
36
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The third-party doctrine achieves the necessary clarity, says
Kerr, by "guarantee [ing] that once information is present in a
location it is treated just like everything else located there."42 So,
for example:
[A] letter that arrives in the mail, is opened, and sits on the
recipient's desk at home ....[It] is treated just like all the
other papers on the desk .... [Tihe Fourth Amendment rules
[that the police] must follow will be set by the usual rules of
home searches rather than special 43rules for each piece of paper
defined by the history of each page.
Kerr seems open to considering an alternative to the thirdparty doctrine, so long as its application is equally clear ex ante4
and, presumably, it meets his other requirements for neutrality.
He seems skeptical, however, as to whether such an alternative
exists. He rejects what he sees as the only alternatives to the
doctrine; they amount to the very thing that Henderson says he
would welcome: "a case-by-case approach."4 5
In addition to arguing directly in defense of the third-party
doctrine, Kerr responds to two criticisms against it. The first is
what Kerr calls a "doctrinal" criticism: "[T]he [Supreme Court]
Justices are wrong when they contend that a person does not
retain a reasonable expectation of privacy [when he shares
information with a third party]. " 6 As mentioned earlier, Kerr
rejects the understanding of the third-party doctrine that
characterizes it as an application of the Katz "reasonable
He argues that, while the Supreme Court
expectation" test.4
seemed like it was getting ready to recognize the doctrine as one
of consent, the Court went "off course" when deciding "United
States v. White, the first third-party case to follow Katz."4" There,
writes Kerr, Justice White:
[C]hose the wrong doctrinal prong. Instead of grounding the
doctrine in consent principles, he reasoned that use of a secret
agent did not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy. The
42

Id.

43 Id.
44 See

id. at 586 ("If critics want to replace the third-party doctrine with an
alternative, they should be clearer about what that alternative would be and how it
would apply in the wide range of cases courts regularly confront.").
45 See Henderson, supra note 25, at 458.
46 Kerr, supra note 15, at 587.
41 See supra text accompanying note 20.
48 Kerr, supra note 15, at 588-89 (footnote omitted).
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difference between the two is subtle: If government conduct
does not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy, it is not a
search, whereas if it violates a reasonable expectation of privacy
pursuant to consent, it 49 is a search but one that is
constitutionally reasonable.
In other words, Kerr argues that the doctrine's critics are
right to think that one's expectation of privacy in the information
one shares with third parties is reasonable. However, he argues,
what is also reasonable is a consented-to search, and this is
precisely what you have in the third-party situation. 0
The second criticism Kerr addresses is something he calls a
"functional" criticism. The criticism is straightforward. It says,
"[T]he third-party doctrine ... gives the police too much power. "51
In particular, Kerr notes, the doctrine's critics are concerned with
abuses of power of the sort recently attributed to Internal
Revenue Service agents.52 Kerr's response consists of pointing
out that "the Fourth Amendment is [not] the only game in town,"
and describing "a wide range of tools ...for addressing police
harassment of third-party information outside the Fourth
Amendment." 53 He divides the tools according to the sorts of
cases in which they are utilized. For the "secret agent" cases,
there are entrapment laws, 4 the Massiah doctrine,5 5 the First
Amendment,56 and internal agency regulations.5 7
For the
business records cases, there are statutory protections, 8 common
law privileges,59 and the rights of third parties.60

Id. at 589 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 589-90.
51 Id. at 590.
52 See, e.g., Sam Stein, IRS Investigator: Tea Party Groups Were Scrutinized
More than Progressive Organizations,HUFFINGTON POST (June 27, 2013, 11:52 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/27/irs-2012-election-n_3510455.html.
13 Kerr, supra note 15, at 590.
49
60

5

See id. at 591-92.

5 See id. at 592-93.
56 See id. at 593-94.
57 See id. at 594-95.

I See id. at 596-97.
11 See id. at 597-98.

60 See id. at 598-600.
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Challenges to Kerr's Defense

Erin Murphy and Richard Epstein both think that the
"negative externalities" of the third-party doctrine outweigh the
benefits it provides in ensuring technological neutrality and
preventing substitution effects. 61 "Specifically," writes Murphy,
"the technologies left exposed by third-party doctrine are not
exclusively deployed for illicit purposes."62 Therefore, she says,
"[F]ailing to protect [these technologies] ... dissuad[es] innocent,
desirable conduct." 3 Similarly, Epstein writes that the doctrine
"creates social inefficiencies with respect to lawful conduct that
people naturally wish to keep from the prying eye of the state."6 4
Yes, the third-party doctrine may prevent a would-be thief from
hiding evidence of his crime behind his ISP, e-mail server host,
online bank, and so forth. But criminal activity is only a small
fraction of the activities for which such businesses and
So, for every crime that is either
technologies are used.
prevented or made more detectable because of the doctrine, there
This is
is much valuable activity that is discouraged.
particularly true after Snowden's revelations about the NSA's
activities. Online anonymity, which entails enjoying less of what
the Internet has to offer, is now the latest in fashion.66
Murphy's critique goes farther than does Epstein's; she
challenges Kerr's substitution effects insight at a fundamental
level. First, she questions whether the average criminal would
be capable of acting rationally enough to deliberately substitute,
for publicly observable means, third-party-assisted means of
achieving his goals.66 Writes Murphy, "What we know about the
criminal actor is that he is usually poor, uneducated, and high on
drugs or alcohol a surprising amount of the time."67 She also
61 Erin Murphy, The Case Against the Case for Third-PartyDoctrine:A Response
to Epstein and Kerr, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239, 1241 (2009).
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Richard A. Epstein, Privacy and the Third Hand: Lessons from the Common
Law of Reasonable Expectations, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1199, 1226 (2009).
61 See generally Stuart Jeffries, Internet Anonymity is the Height of Chic, THE

GUARDIAN (June 12, 2013), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2013/un/12/
internet-anonymity-chic-google-hidden.
I Murphy, supra note 61, at 1242.
67 Id.
(citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2007-STATISTICAL TABLES (2010), http://www.bjs.gov/content/
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doubts whether there are technological, third-party-assisted
alternatives available for the commission of many crimes.68 Sure,
it might be easier to evade detection while stalking someone
online instead of stalking them in the physical world; but, as
Murphy notes, "One generally cannot murder, rape, or cause
serious bodily injury via technology alone."69 Moreover, she says,
even if Kerr wanted to focus his examination on the most
frequently committed offenses, he would find little support for his
view: "Technology does not offer much by way of protection from
accusations of disorderly conduct, or drinking and driving, or
even drug distribution-the kinds of crime that, for better or for
worse, make up the vast majority of criminal offenses in our
country."70
Yes, there are some crimes that seem particularly well suited
for "third-party technological outsourcing," as Murphy calls it. 7 '
With respect to these, however, she suggests that what is at play
is not a substitution effect, but rather "a sub-species of crimes in
which third-party participation is an indispensable component
(or even instrument) of the offense."7 2 Any increased difficulty in
investigating such crimes in the absence of a third-party doctrine
is not, she says, due to substitution of the Internet for other
means of committing the crime. 7 ' Murphy thinks the difficulty
comes from the fact that the Internet and digital duplication
technology make it possible for there to be many more
offenders-for example, producers and consumers of child
pornography-whom the police must apprehend.7 4
Murphy also rejects the idea of using the third-party doctrine
as a means of "equalizing" offenses that are public with offenses
that are private or particularly heinous.75 She notes that the
Constitution "[does] not obliterate privacy protections for the
home, for instance, just because the vast majority of child sexual

pub/html/jsst/2007/fjs07st.pdf (title renamed from "Criminal Offender Statistics" by

the Bureau of Justice Statistics)).
68 Id. at 1243.
69
70
71
72
73
74

Id.
Id.
Id.

Id. Murphy gives "child pornography or internet fraud" as examples. Id.
Id.
Id.

75 Id. at 1244.
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abuse occurs there."76 Most importantly, Murphy challenges
Kerr's assertion that, in the types of cases that truly invite
technology substitution-"offenses like theft, fraud, or [certain]
white collar crimes" 7 -substitution will make it harder for the
police to do their job. In fact, Murphy suggests that the difficulty
of the police's job will be roughly the same whether or not
substitution occurs.7 8 "Third parties," she writes, "increase the
possibility that a trail will be left or witnesses will be created, all
of which only helps the state in building its case."79 The police
may need to get a warrant based on probable cause in order to
obtain pieces of evidence in the possession of third parties;
however, "that is not a particularly high U standard to meet.8 0
And once the police get their hands on that evidence, she notes,
chances are it will turn out to be more valuable, more probative,
than, for example, "the testimony of [a stalking] victim that some
guy keeps coming around."' 81 Finally, Murphy adds that, should
there be a particularly thorny case that police need to
investigate, there is always "the grand jury, which is virtually
immune from Fourth Amendment strictures." 2
Kerr responds to many of Murphy's criticisms in an essay 3
published alongside hers and Epstein's. First, he says that her
observation that most criminals are not rational actors is beside
the point.8 4 The substitution effect exists so long as criminals in
fact replace their publicly observable acts with protected thirdparty transactions; what their motivation is for doing so is
irrelevant.8 5 Also beside the point, says Kerr, is the relative
prevalence of crimes for which third-party substitution is
possible. 6
[Tihe key question is not whether the third-party doctrine is
necessary for the police to investigate every type of crime. The
question is whether, on the whole, the rule enables the proper
76

Id.

77 Id.
78

79

Id.
Id.

80 Id.
81 Id.
82

Id. (citing United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1973)).

I, Orin S. Kerr, Defending the Third-Party Doctrine:A Response to Epstein and
Murphy, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1229, 1233-36 (2009).

8 Id. at 1233-34.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 1234.
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balance between privacy and security given the need for rules
that encompass investigations into all different types of
crimes. 87
Kerr says his "favorite of Murphy's arguments" is her
contention that it is risky for criminals to rely on third parties in
the commission of their crimes, because it makes it easier for
them to be caught.88 In his response, Kerr first sets aside the
idea of criminals engaging in a rational cost-benefit analysis
before deciding whether to use third parties.8 9 He then argues
that, insofar as the use of third parties leaves a trail of evidence
behind, that trail of evidence is virtually inaccessible in the
absence of the third-party doctrine: "In a world without the
third-party doctrine, the risks of group crimes would be much
lower. The now-exposed paper trail presumably would be as
protected as secret plans stored in the suspect's sock drawer." 90
Moreover, says Kerr, even if there were some real cost-benefit
analysis to be performed, the most controversial applications of
the third-party doctrine involve third parties-banks, phone
companies, and ISPs-who pose the least risk in terms of
becoming snitches. 91 They are companies that, in the normal
course of business, engage in minimal customer monitoring and
have a market incentive to preserve customer privacy.9 2
I found Kerr's response to Murphy to be unconvincing with
respect to a few issues. First, I agree with Murphy that police
investigation of crimes involving third parties, in the absence of
the third-party doctrine, would not be as difficult as Kerr
suggests. To commit a crime means, concretely, to initiate force
or use fraud against another person or his property. No matter
what means one employs to do this, there will be some trail of
evidence left behind, a trail that can be followed and used to
apprehend the criminal. Yes, in the absence of the third-party
doctrine a warrant may be required to figure out, for example,
who uses the Internet Protocol address linked to an online theft
from a bank account. However, as Murphy says, that should not
be too difficult to get.
Id.
98 Id.
89 See id. at 1234-35.
87

90Id. at 1235.
91 See id.
92

Id.
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The second point to make is that Kerr, in his response to
Murphy, seems to assume that the government plays no role in
the decisions companies make about monitoring their customers
or preserving their privacy. As we have learned recently, Verizon
has for years been subjected to court orders demanding
continuous collection and reporting of customers' metadata,
regardless of Verizon's own business needs or preferences for
preserving customer privacy.93 Finally, Kerr fails to respond to
an important point Murphy raises about the Constitution: There
are some things the Constitution will protect-for example, the
home-even though removing that protection might yield a
bonanza in terms of facilitating investigation of particularly
heinous crimes. 94
Overall, Murphy provides a formidable challenge to Kerr's
arguments about the third-party doctrine's role in preventing
substitution and preserving the technological neutrality of the
Fourth Amendment. Kerr is concerned that eliminating the
third-party doctrine would encourage substitution of third-partyassisted means of committing criminal offenses, and that this
would help criminals to avoid detection of their crimes. Murphy
makes us doubt both the incidence of substitution and the gravity
of its consequences.
Aside from his observation that the social inefficiencies
created by the third-party doctrine may outweigh the
substitution effects about which Kerr is concerned,95 Epstein's
critique is implicit in the alternative model he presents in his
article. Epstein suggests that the Fourth Amendment might be
more flexible in its treatment of third-party cases, allowing
courts to ratify not only searches based on probable cause, but
also, in the appropriate case, searches based only on reasonable
suspicion.9" In Kerr's response, he notes that Epstein, "Ib]y
assuming away the all-or-nothing framework [of the Fourth
Amendment],... dramatically changes the costs and benefits of
In essence, Epstein's argument
the third-party doctrine."97
against the substitution effect is to propose a legal framework,

93
94
95
96

97

See Greenwald, supra note 3.
See supra text accompanying note 76.
See supra text accompanying note 64.
Epstein, supra note 64, at 1224-25.
Kerr, supra note 83, at 1232.
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based on different assumptions, in which the substitution effect
does not exist. Accordingly, Kerr finds that Epstein "ends up
answering a very different set of questions." 8
Suppose that Kerr is correct, that the substitution effect
would be significant and that eliminating the third-party
doctrine would adversely affect the technological neutrality of the
Fourth Amendment. In that case, one approach would be to
balance, as Epstein and Murphy do, the substitution effects
against the negative externalities of the third-party doctrine, and
decide what to do accordingly. Another approach-one I believe
to be preferable-is to treat the question as one of individual
rights in the traditional sense, where rights are not "interests" to
be balanced against "the public good," or as part of some
On this approach, the only
elaborate utilitarian calculus.
questions to ask would be: What are the rights at issue, and
what does it mean for the government to protect these rights in
the context of a criminal investigation? Yes, we delegate our
right of self-defense to the government, and that entails the
government sometimes being able to investigate whether or not
the target of the investigation has consented.9 9 Nonetheless,
delegating one's right of self-defense does not mean that the
government can investigate whomever it wants, whenever and
however it wants. The government must have some objective
reason, typically probable cause, to believe a particular person or
group of persons is involved in criminal activity. While a full
defense of this overall approach is beyond the scope of this
Article, the alternative to the third-party doctrine presented in
Part II of this paper will help to further elucidate it and thereby,
I hope, contribute to its plausibility in the mind of the reader.
With respect to Kerr's argument about the need for ex ante
clarity, again we see Murphy and Epstein concurring in their
initial response. If clarity is what you are after, why not opt for
what Murphy calls the "libertarian baseline?": "[A] very clear
Id. Kerr also objects to the fact that Epstein's model "eliminates the
institutional choice between constitutional regulation and either statutory or
98

administrative regulation." Id. What is, on Kerr's understanding of the Fourth
Amendment, the province of either statutory or administrative law becomes, for
Epstein, the province of"a flexible Fourth Amendment." Id. at 1232-33.
99 In other words, I join Epstein in rejecting the "libertarian baseline" he
mentions in his piece. Epstein, supra note 64, at 1211 (describing a "libertarian

baseline" which "makes all forms of criminal investigation illegal without the
consent of the parties who are investigated").
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rule (and one with ample constitutional support) that simply
prohibits all third-party investigation without a warrant or
probable cause."'0 0 Murphy then goes further and assumes, for
the sake of argument, that ex ante clarity would require
eliminating rather than fortifying third-party protections, and
tackles a hypothetical Kerr posits in his paper: An anonymous
blog commenter writes about a Senator taking a bribe. 1 1 The
problem for police, who would like to subpoena the commenter, is
to determine the commenter's relationship to the Senator.
Without a categorical third-party doctrine, the relationship
between the two is crucial for determining the police's ability to
subpoena the commenter.
As with Kerr's concerns about substitution and technological
neutrality, Murphy argues that Kerr's concerns here are
overblown. A grand jury, she notes, could easily subpoena the
ISP for the name of the commenter. 10 2 A police officer may not be
able to do so, but for Murphy, the trade-off is worth it: "Sure, we
want to catch... Senators with fat pockets, but not at the
expense of trading individual liberty for blind faith in the
statements of any Tom, Dick, or Jane with [an internet]
connection."' 10 3 Once the government knows the name of the
commenter, Murphy explains, it can either easily question the
commenter in the context of a grand jury investigation; or, in the
case of a police investigation, the police can ask about the
commenter's relationship to the Senator at the outset of the
interview, and either stop or continue the conversation
depending upon the answer received. 0 4
In Kerr's response, he explains that his hypothetical about
the bribe-taking Senator was meant to illustrate a possible
alternative to the third-party doctrine: a legal regime "in which
the question of whether an expectation of privacy is 'reasonable'
must be answered by a probabilistic determination in each case
of whether there was a person who once had the information who

100Murphy, supra note 61, at

1245. Note that what Epstein calls

the

"libertarian baseline" seems to be quite a different animal. See supra note 99.
Murphy's libertarian seems to believe in limited government, whereas Epstein's
libertarian seems to be somewhat of an anarchist.
101 Murphy, supra note 61, at 1245.
102 Id. at 1245-46.
103

Id. at 1246.

104

Id.
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reasonably expected privacy."105
Murphy, in answering the
hypothetical, was, so far as I can tell, imagining a world just like
ours except that there is no third-party doctrine, and showing
that ex ante clarity can be achieved in that world. In other
words, she is analyzing Kerr's hypothetical in the world of her
"libertarian baseline." 106 Kerr seems to be distracted by the
repurposing of his hypothetical, and so he fails to respond to
Murphy here. Instead, he decides to point to the fact that
Murphy offers only "a few vague proposals" for an alternative to
the third-party doctrine as evidence that it is difficult to do so
while effectively addressing Kerr's concerns about ex ante
clarity. 0 7 Still, repurposed as it was, I found Murphy's treatment
of Kerr's hypothetical convincing with respect to the issue of ex
ante clarity. I admit I may be biased, however, because, as we
will see, the approach I suggest and defend in this Article is not
far from Murphy's libertarian baseline.
Epstein does not take the ex ante clarity issue head-on, but
rather proposes an alternative analysis in which he believes the
issue of clarity has been adequately addressed. "The boundary
lines between these various areas [to which Epstein applies his
framework] are for the most part relatively clear, so that the
borderline interpretation issues should not muddy the overall
inquiry."0 8 Kerr does not discuss the issue of clarity in his
response to Epstein, but I believe that he would reject Epstein's
framework on this ground as well. What Epstein is proposing is,
in essence, a case-by-case inquiry into the social utility of
protecting privacy.
Taking up Kerr's treatment of the "doctrinal" critique of the
third-party doctrine in his own article, Epstein rejects Kerr's
consent-based understanding of the doctrine. Just as it begs the
question to say that one who shares information with a third
party "assumes the risk" of disclosure, Epstein explains, a similar
objection can be made to the claim that one "consents" to the
disclosure of information by sharing it with a third party. 0 9
Epstein describes what is going on in a case covered by the third-

105Kerr, supra note 83, at 1236.
106

See Murphy, supra note 61, at 1245-46.

107

Kerr, supra note 83, at 1236.

108 Epstein, supra note 64, at 1202.

109Id. at 1201.
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party doctrine as tantamount to "fraud in the inducement."'110 He
notes that the common law will not hold one who gave his
consent accountable as against the party who committed a fraud
in order to induce that consent.' 1 ' "In Fourth Amendment cases,"
writes Epstein, "this party is the government, so we are back at
square one." 2
For my part, I wonder whether Epstein's
observation is true in all Fourth Amendment cases, or just in the
"secret agent" cases, but I agree with Epstein that it is questionbegging to say that a person consents to have his information
shared with a third party, the government, simply because he
shared it with a second party for a limited purpose. Epstein
writes:
To be sure, there are many cases where the consent of the party
searched meets the standard of individualized consent
developed in private law settings. But in other cases the
nominal consent is presumed on the ground that on balance
people are better off from the ex ante perspective 113if they are
forced to submit to some searches against their will.
In other words, "consent" is often just a proxy for social
utility. Murphy agrees with Epstein in his critique of Kerr's
consent-based analysis of the doctrine. "I . . . share Professor
Epstein's sense that Professor Kerr's 'consent' model seems to
just circle back to the reasonable expectation of privacy test." 4
She also agrees with Epstein that a viable alternative to the
doctrine might be "geared toward optimizing social utility." 115 I
agree with Epstein and Murphy about the essential identity of
"consent" and "reasonable expectations" understandings of the
doctrine, as well as with their sense that, whichever of these two
concepts you use to explicate the doctrine, the doctrine is
unworkable. However, as we will see, I would not frame the
alternative in terms of maximizing social utility.
In his response to Epstein's article, Kerr observes that
Epstein, after drawing upon "insights from libertarian political
theory, the common law of torts, and Fifth Amendment takings
law,... concludes that the question of 'reasonable expectations'

110 Id.
"I
112
113
114
115

Id.

Id. at 1202.
Id. at 1206.
Murphy, supranote 61, at 1241 n.6.

Id.
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requires a cost-benefit analysis."116
Kerr doubts, however,
whether Epstein's "first-principles rethinking" of the third-party
situation actually adds anything to existing doctrine, and offers
examples from existing case law and statute in which the cases
are treated essentially the same as what Epstein envisions. 1 7
Kerr's discussion of the functional critique of the third-party
doctrine warrants some attention as well. Recall that Kerr's
response to this critique, which says that the doctrine gives the
government too much power, is to note that "the Fourth
Amendment is [not] the only game in town," and to discuss the
supplemental privacy protections afforded by statutory and
administrative law, as well as common law rules and evidentiary
privileges. 8
Murphy's answer to Kerr here is brief. She
emphasizes the fact that these alternatives are "nonconstitutional"-that is, that they do not provide the same
protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment-and says she
does not think they are "anywhere near adequate."'119
I will defer to Murphy with respect to her evaluation of the
adequacy of criminal procedure doctrine.
With respect to
statutory protection for access to business records, note that
what a statute giveth, a statute may taketh away: The invasive
activities of the NSA described in the introduction to this Article
were apparently authorized by statute, despite the statutory
protections relied upon by Kerr. More importantly, and likely
also relevant to the legality of the NSA's activities, Kerr admits
that "[i]n many ...cases, the statutory privacy laws provide less
protection than would the analogous Fourth Amendment
standard of a probable cause warrant."12 0 As for the privileges,
even if Murphy were wrong in saying that they "are barely worth
the paper they are printed on," 21 I fail to see how they are
116 Kerr, supra note 83, at 1230.
117 Id. at 1231-32. I might quibble

a bit with Kerr's conclusion here. Kerr offers

the following quotation from Hudson v. Palmer as a sample of a court conducting a
cost-benefit analysis: "[R]ecognition of privacy rights for prisoners in their individual
cells simply cannot be reconciled with the concept of incarceration and the needs and

objectives of penal institutions." Id. at 1231 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
517, 526 (1984)). Insofar as the Court discusses the "concept of incarceration," and
perhaps even the "objectives of penal institutions," it seems to be going beyond
simple cost-benefit analysis. See id. (emphasis added).
11 See supra text accompanying notes 53-60.
"1 Murphy, supra note 61, at 1250-51.
120 Kerr, supra note 15, at 597.
121 Murphy, supra note 61, at 1251.
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relevant to a situation involving me and my cell phone company,
or me and my ISP, or me and Facebook. Finally, it is true that
third parties may often assert the rights of their customers and,
as Kerr notes, "Protecting customer privacy is good for
business." 122 However, with respect to the aforementioned NSA
programs, third parties have had to conduct these challenges
entirely in secret and then, when ultimately compelled to turn
over their customers' data, they have been forced to deny any
knowledge of or participation in the programs. 123
Further,
Murphy points out that, even in cases in which the companies
have the opportunity to fight subpoenas publicly, few are willing
to stand up to the government-and those124few are relegated to
using legal doctrines that seem inapposite.
Drawing upon critiques by Murphy and Epstein, and
throwing in a few of my own, I hope I have poked enough holes in
Kerr's defense of the third-party doctrine to have further
motivated the search for an alternative. It is to that alternative
that we now turn.

II. AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL
A.

A Model for Legal Protectionof Information Privacy Based on
Our Rights to Property and Contract
My proposal rests on a free-market model for the protection
of informational privacy that I have been elucidating and
defending for several years. 2 5 What I have suggested is that we
return to the era of protecting privacy on the basis of our rights
to property and contract, as was the case before a famous 1890
law review article 2 6 written by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D.
Brandeis. In other words, I reject the so-called right to privacy.
My argument starts with the same observation as that of those

Kerr, supra note 15, at 598.
See Dominic Rushe, Google and Facebook Ask DoJ for Permission To Publish
Fisa Requests, THE GUARDIAN (June 11, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2013/jun/11/google-doj-permission-publish-fisa-requests; Dominic Rushe,
122
121

Yahoo Wants Fisa Objections Revealed, THE GUARDIAN (July 10, 2013), http:/!

www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jul/111/yahoo-wants-fisa-objections-revealed.
124 Murphy,
supra note 61, at 1251 (discussing Google's challenge to a
government subpoena for its customers' information, in which Google appealed to
trade secret doctrine).
121 See generally Peikoff, supra note 16.
126 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 213 (1890).
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who, in the literature, are known as "reductionists."
Reductionists note that cases in which most of us believe an
individual's privacy should be legally protected can be reduced to
cases in which the individual is exercising property and contract
rights in order to protect his privacy. 127 You do not want someone
to see or hear what you are doing in your home? Lock your doors,
close your windows, and shut your blinds. You want to keep your
financial information private? Well, before the government
started compelling the bulk collection and reporting of financial
data"--something for which we have the third-party doctrine to
thank-you could protect your financial privacy simply by having
a confidentiality clause in your contract with your bank.
Yes, there are tricky cases involving new technologies in
which it can be difficult to see how our rights to property and
contract can do the job. I think in many cases, however, courts
have given up too easily. Take, for example, Olmstead v. United
States.2 9 There, the government tapped a phone line to listen to
Olmstead's phone conversations. 3 °
The Supreme Court,
ostensibly relying on the trespass doctrine, held that the
government's conduct did not amount to a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.131 "The amendment does not
forbid what was done here. There was no searching. There was
no seizure. The evidence was secured by the use of the sense of
hearing and that only. There was no entry of the houses or
132
offices of the defendants."

I think the Court failed properly to apply the trespass
doctrine in that case. There may not have been a physical
trespass to "the houses or offices of the defendants," but there
was a physical trespass to the phone company's phone lines, just
as there was a trespass to the vehicle of Jones's wife in United

127

See generally Amy

L.

Peikoff, The

Right to Privacy: Contemporary

Reductionists and Their Critics, 13 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 474, 474 (2006).
128 See, e.g., Bank Secrecy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1829b (2012).
129 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
130
131
132

Id. at 456-57.
Id. at 465.
Id. at 464.
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States v. Jones.3 3 The phone lines may not have belonged to the
defendants, but the defendants had purchased exclusive access to
them during the time of their calls. 3
I believe that not only is a distinct "right to privacy"
superfluous-as do the reductionists-it is also immoral, in that
it tends to displace and thereby undermine our fundamental
rights to property and contract. 35 Further, because it is our
rights to property and contract that enable us to achieve states of
privacy, the consequence of recognizing a distinct right to privacy
is, in fact, less privacy protection. The recent revelations about
intrusive NSA programs are just the latest examples. In an
earlier article, after reviewing the 1970s business records cases, I
wrote:
If the controlling standard in these cases had been one's right to
property, along with one's right to use his property to enter into
contracts, then a man's privacy would not be dependent on
others' opinions about what he actually expects and whether his
expectations are reasonable. Rather, it would depend solely on
his ability to produce values and to trade those values for the
means to protect the privacy he seeks.
Of course, the
government could still issue warrants to compel third parties to
disclose information that has been entrusted to them. But at
least then the disclosure of information would depend on factors
such as particularized suspicion and limited scope of
search .... 136
B.

Applying the Model to the Third-PartySituation

Applying the above model to the third-party situation would
be straightforward: An individual has a contract with a third
party-a bank, a phone company, or an ISP. The contract
contains a provision, preferably explicit, according to which the
third party promises, as part of the consideration for the
customer's money and patronage, to keep his information private.
If the third party reveals a customer's private information, it has
breached the contract and could be compelled to pay damages
accordingly. Moreover, the government, in order to compel the
third party to breach its contract with you, would need to get a
133
134

132 S. Ct. 945, 949, 952 (2012).

One who rents an apartment to live in does not own that apartment, but it is
still treated as one's home for Fourth Amendment purposes.
131 See Peikoff, supra note 16, at 34-46.
13' Id. at 40.
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search warrant or the equivalent, based upon probable cause and
particularized suspicion. If it failed to do so, the modern remedy
would likely be the exclusionary rule, but I would prefer to
return to the traditional trespass model of the Fourth
Amendment, 137 under which we might charge the government
with tortious interference with contract.
Suppose, for example, the police found, on a publicly
available Internet discussion forum, a post by a person who says
he wants to blow up participants and spectators at the Boston
Marathon. If the police discovered this early enough, such that
the threatened attack was not imminent, then they could go to a
judge, present the evidence they have amounting to probable
cause and pointing to a particular individual or group of
individuals, and get a warrant. The warrant would compel the
forum host to reveal the Internet Protocol address of the post's
author, which could then lead the police to the real person, who
could then be investigated as appropriate. If a threat were
imminent, criminal procedure would allow for an exception to the
warrant requirement; 138 this would be no less true in cyberspace
than it is in physical space. What would be gone, on my model,
are the days of government, for example, compelling banks to
compile and hand over data about all transactions in excess of
$5,000, regardless of who engaged in them, and then combining
that data with data produced by another "third party"-for
example, Facebook-and then running searches on the combined
database with no warrant, no probable cause, and no
particularized suspicion.
C. Evaluatingthe Model
How might the scholars discussed in Part I of this Article
evaluate my suggested model for approaching privacy and, in
particular, the third-party cases? While Murphy might agree
with my view that the third-party doctrine should be thrown out
entirely, she might not approve of my model, based as it is in
rights to property and contract. Murphy asks, "Is there any
principled basis for allowing [an individual] to voluntarily
137 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment FirstPrinciples,107 HARV. L.
REV. 757, 774 (1994) (explaining that, traditionally, police who conducted an
unreasonable search without a warrant could be sued and forced to pay damages in
trespass).
138 See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967).
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provide
information
or
give
up
documents
to
investigators ...while forbidding the same voluntary compliance
from third parties? Even if such a basis existed, could it be
articulated and enforced?"'39
I would love to say that the common law of contract is
exactly what Murphy is seeking here. However, her halfhearted and self-refuted defense of the third-party doctrine as a
socioeconomic equalizer, 14 0 combined with her worry that relying
on legislation to protect our privacy would leave "the poor and
" ' leads me to conclude that
disempowered ...unprotected,"14
Murphy is probably not in favor of returning to a legal system in
which our rights to property and contract are strictly enforced.
Epstein might agree with much that my model has to offer,
but there would likely be many cases where we would be at odds,
due to his embrace of the reasonable expectations test as a proxy
for deciding these cases based on social utility. Epstein's "central
approach is to use the language of reasonable expectations as a
way to forge a sensible set of rules that optimizes social welfare
with respect to a given kind of problem."' 4 2 Not only does Epstein
rely on a foundation, utilitarianism, which contradicts my entire
approach, he also ends up proposing a framework that, although
it is different institutionally, yields results similar to what we see
14 3
today.
I would hope that Kerr would give me plenty of points for ex
ante clarity. However, I am fairly sure that he would reject my
model as sacrificing too much security for the sake of privacy. He
139
140

Murphy, supra note 61, at 1252.
Id. at 1247-48. Murphy suggests that one might argue that the third-party

doctrine makes it harder to conceal white-collar crimes, which are presumably
committed by upper-class, rich criminals. In this way, she says, the doctrine can be
seen as leveling the playing field between rich criminals and poor criminals. Id. at
1247. Now, one might wonder why anyone cares to level the playing field between
rich and poor criminals anyway, but this is not why Murphy rejects this argument.
She ends up dismissing it because she doubts the connection between the third-party
doctrine and white-collar crime. Id. Also, she notes, the rich would-be criminals can
spend their money lobbying for Congress to create statutory protection for

information we share with third parties, something that would undo whatever
equalizing effect the doctrine may have had. Id. at 1247-48.
141Id. at 1253.
142Epstein, supra note 64, at 1202.
143 Kerr, supra note 83, at 1232-33 (noting that the biggest difference between
Kerr and Epstein is that Epstein rejects the "all-or-nothing options of Fourth
Amendment law," and "eliminates the institutional choice"); see also supra notes
116-17 and accompanying text.
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would remind me of the substitution effects made possible by
eliminating the third-party doctrine, of how much more difficult I
have made it for police to investigate crimes facilitated by third
parties. My essential answer to Kerr is that I do not believe it is
right to "balance" privacy and security. 4 4 I think the proper goal
is to determine what rights exist, and then to figure out what it
means to recognize and protect these rights in the context of law
enforcement. If recognizing and protecting individual rights
makes the job of law enforcement more difficult, so be it. Still, I
do think there is an elaboration on this basic model that will, to
some extent, address Kerr's concerns. That is the topic of Part
III.
III. ADDRESSING AN OBJECTION: ILLEGAL CONTRACTS
I have not yet explained how I propose to treat Tony
Soprano's basement conversations with government informants,
and yet it is precisely this type of "secret agent" case that made
the third-party doctrine seem plausible in the first place. If there
is a way to have the benefit of third-party protections for the
majority of us, who do not engage in illegal behavior, while
chipping away at some of the "substitution effect" that Kerr
warns us about with respect to criminal activity, 145 would that
not be ideal? Thankfully, the common law of contracts provides a
rule that allows us to address these "secret agent" cases, the
cases that gave rise to the third-party doctrine, consistent with
my model for the legal protection of privacy.
At common law, illegal contracts are not enforceable. 46 An
illegal contract is one whose subject matter-the thing to be done
pursuant to the contract, the consideration provided for at least
one of the parties' promises-is illegal. Specifically:
[I]t may be broadly said that a bargain will be declared illegal or
unenforceable if:
1. The consideration for a promise in it is an illegal act or
forbearance;

144 Note that the philosophical foundation for my model of privacy is Ayn Rand's
theory of rights and that, according to Rand, rights do not conflict and are not
subject to "balancing." See generally Peikoff, supra note 16 (explaining Rand's theory
of rights and its application to the problem of the legal protection of privacy).
145 See supra text accompanying notes 34-39.
146 See 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 12:1 (4th ed. 2009).

2014]

OF THIRD-PARTY BATHWATER

2. It is illegal to make some promise in the bargain, even
though what is promised might be legally performed;
3. Some performance promised is illegal;
4. A provision is included for a condition in violation of law; or
5. According to the modern view, embodied in the Restatement
Second, "the interest in enforcement [of a promise or term] is
clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy
of such terms," in which case the term
against the enforcement
1 47
will be unenforceable.
The defense is not just a relic taught in law schools and
tested on bar exams: One scholar methodically examined all of
the federal and state court cases in which any defense falling into
the broader category of "public policy" was employed during the
latter half of 2009.148 His analysis showed that defenses based on
a violation of a statute or regulation-among these would be
those based on illegal contracts-had the highest success rate:
Accordingly, David Adam Friedman
fifty-nine percent. 149
described the illegality defense as the least "unruly" of the public
policy defenses. °
In one of the cases he surveyed, the South Dakota Supreme
Court refused to enforce a promissory note in excess of $30,000, a
substantial portion of which was still due and payable, because a
small fraction of the note's total amount, $1,500, was in
If such cases are
consideration of a gambling debt. 1
representative, it is reasonable to conclude that a court presented
with an illegal contract would deny enforcement of any explicit or
implicit provision promising to keep private any information
shared pursuant to the contract. Tony Soprano's revelations to a
147 Id. (footnotes omitted). Note that today there is some overlap, acknowledged
in Williston's treatise, between the traditional contract defense of illegality and the
modern defense of a contract being against "public policy." My proposal in this
Article relies only on the former, as a way to account for the "secret agent" cases in
the context of my model for the legal protection of privacy. However, it seems that
those who prefer the more pragmatic "reasonable expectation of privacy" standard
could employ the "public policy" portion of this defense as an explanatory gloss for
the "reasonableness" of one's expectation of privacy.
148 David Adam Friedman, Bringing Order to Contracts Against Public Policy,
39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 563, 577 (2012).
149 Id. at 581.
150 Id. at 566-67. The broad category of public policy defenses was famously
described by Judge Burrough as a "very unruly horse." Id. at 564 (quoting
Richardson v. Mellish, (1824) 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303; 2 Bing 229, 251-52 (Burrough,

151 Id.

at 594-95 (citing Neve v. Davis, 775 N.W.2d 80, 81-82 (S.D. 2009)).
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secret agent could therefore be shared with the government and
used to prosecute Soprano without a warrant or probable cause.
No third-party doctrine is required.
CONCLUSION: BEYOND THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE

In this Article, I suggest how the third-party doctrine might
be abandoned while preserving the government's ability to use
undercover informants and secret agents. I believe I have shown
that the choice we have been given thus far-invasive
government programs and security on the one hand versus
privacy and vulnerability on the other-is a false alternative. I
hope I have also offered further demonstration of the power of a
model of legal protection for privacy based on the rights to
property and contract.
Getting rid of the third-party doctrine is necessary, not
because one has a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in
information shared with a third party, but rather because the
third-party doctrine fails to recognize and protect our rights to
property and contract within the context of government law
enforcement activity. In fact, as I have argued elsewhere,5 2 the
reasonable expectation standard of Katz is itself flawed and
should be eliminated. I do not think it is enough to carve out
enclaves for the traditional trespass doctrine, as Justice Scalia
has done in recent cases. 53 Two-tier legal protection for privacy,
as Justice Scalia explicitly suggests in Jones,5 might be an
acceptable waystation, while the courts figure out how properly
to apply property and contract doctrines to cases involving the
Internet and other technologies. But the final goal should be to
recognize that property and contract are the foundations of
155
privacy, and that Warren and Brandeis were wrong.

152

Amy L. Peikoff, Pragmatismand Privacy, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 638, 658-

61 (analyzing and critiquing the Katz "reasonable expectation of privacy" test).
153

Id. at 665-69 (explaining why Justice Scalia's approach in Kyllo v. United

States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), is not, despite appearances, a fundamental departure
from Katz).
151 United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 953 (2012) ("[Ulnlike the concurrence,
which would make Katz the exclusive test, we do not make trespass the exclusive

test. Situations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without
trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.").
15' This goal may not be that unrealistic: Stephen Henderson, for example, asks
"whether Jones might be a first step in the Court jettisoning the reasonable
expectation of privacy criterion." Henderson, supra note 25, at 451.
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I am hopeful that today's widespread concern about
government databases and invasive NSA programs can be used
to motivate courts and legislators to reconsider the third-party
doctrine and, ultimately, the whole model for the legal protection
of privacy.
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